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ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that "minor child" is ambiguousPlaintiffs assert that the term "minor child" is ambiguous, without any

analysis of the words. Plaintiffs rely only on the absence of a definition of the
term in the wrongful death statute and the fact that the Utah Legislature did not
explicitly exclude unborn children from the statute's coverage. See Plaintiffs'
Opening Brief at 10-11. A statute's terms are not rendered ambiguous merely
because they are not defined, however. If that were true, the vast majority of
statutory terms would be ambiguous.
Instead, as discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, the Court looks to
the "plain meaning" of statutory terms to determine whether they are ambiguous.
See U.S. Op. Br. at 7. Terms are considered ambiguous only if they "may be
understood to have two or more plausible meanings." R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C.
v. Utah Prop, and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n. 2008 UT 80, ^ 23, 199 P.3d 917 (citation
and internal quotations omitted). Words are not ambiguous "simply because one
party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her
own interests." See Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274-75
(Utah 1993) (footnote omitted) (interpreting terms of an insurance policy). If a
statutory term is not ambiguous, the Court will not look beyond the plain language
1

to the legislative history or policy considerations. Vigos v. Mountainland
Builders. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, ^ 13, 993 P.2d 207.
The analytical framework for interpreting statutory language is exemplified
by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996). In Clyde,
the plaintiffs' minor daughter was killed in a car accident. The plaintiffs' daughter
was pregnant and unmarried at the time of her death, and the fetus did not survive
the accident. After the plaintiffs settled with the other driver's insurer, they filed a
claim with State Farm, their own insurer, under the underinsured-motorist
provision of their policy. The plaintiffs sought recovery not only for the death of
their daughter but also for the death of her unborn child.
State Farm filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to maintain an action for the wrongful death of their unborn
grandchild. State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs
were neither "parents" nor "guardians" of their daughter's unborn child, as
required by the wrongful death statute. Id at 1185 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 7811-6). The trial court granted State Farm's motion.
The plaintiffs appealed and argued that "because they provided [their
daughter's], and therefore her unborn child's, sole means of support, they stood in
loco parentis to the unborn child and should be treated as de facto parents or
2

guardians under section 78-11-6." IdL This Court first noted that '"the right of
action to recover damages for death is not a common-law right, but is one created
by statute, and hence the law creating the right can also prescribe the conditions of
its enforcement.'" IdL (citing Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 64 Utah 125,
228 P. 557, 560 (1924)). The Court then looked to the plain language of the
wrongful death statute in order to give effect to the legislature's intent.1 Id at
1186. The Court determined that the ordinary meaning of "parent" does not
include a grandparent or other person standing in loco parentis. The Court further
determined that the well-established legal meaning of "guardian" includes only
one who has been validly appointed as a guardian. Based on the plain meaning of
these terms, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were neither parents nor
guardians of their unborn grandchild and thus were not entitled to maintain a claim
under Utah's wrongful death statute. Id. at 1186-87.
Since the plaintiffs in Clyde lacked standing to pursue their claim, the Court
declined to address "the more general question of whether the death of a fetus can
ever provide the basis for maintaining an action under section 78-11-6." Id, at

1

The wrongful death statute did not define "parent" or "guardian," nor did it
explicitly exclude grandparents.
3

1187 n.4 (citing Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah 1942) and Nelson v.
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Utah 1975) (Maughan, J., dissenting)).
That issue is now squarely before the Court, and an analysis of the plain language
of the wrongful death statute is determinative of the issue.
As discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, "child" has more than one
plausible meaning. See U.S. Op. Br. at 7-8. But the Legislature created a cause of
action only for the death of a "minor" child, and the Legislature is presumed to
have used the term "minor" advisedly.2 Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007
UT 42,146, 164 P.3d 384. A "minor" child is one who has achieved an age
between birth and 18 years. See U.S. Op. Br. at 8-9. By definition, then, an
unborn child cannot be a "minor child." Since this term is not ambiguous, the
Court need not look beyond the statutory language. The plain meaning of the
wrongful death statute does not provide a cause of action for the wrongful death of
an unborn child.

2

Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that "minor child" was added to the wrongful
death statute by a 2003 amendment. See Pis.' Op. Br. at 14. In fact, the statute
has used the term "minor child" since at least 1898. See U.S. Op. Br. at 6.
4

II.

Even if "minor child" were ambiguous, the Utah Legislature's explicit
reference to "unborn" children or individuals in other statutes shows
that the Legislature did not intend that the wrongful death statute
provide a claim arising from the death of an unborn child.
Although this Court determined in Clyde that the plain language of the

wrongful death statute was determinative, the Court also examined other evidence
of the Utah Legislature's intent. The Court noted that the Legislature had
expressly included persons standing "in loco parentis" in several other statutes but
did not do so in the wrongful death statute. 920 P.2d at 1187. The Court
explained that this supported its interpretation of the statute: "[T]he legislature
knew how to use the term 'in loco parentis' but chose not to do so in section 7811-6 and therefore did not intend to allow persons standing in loco parentis to
maintain an action for the wrongful death of a minor." kL (footnote omitted).
As discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, the same reasoning
applies in the present case. The Utah Legislature has enacted several statutes in
which it expressly included "unborn" children or individuals in addition to
"children" or "minor" children. See U.S. Op. Br. at 10-11. Thus, to paraphrase
this Court's reasoning in Clyde, the Legislature knows how to include the unborn
in statutory language but chose not to do so in the wrongful death statute, and thus
did not intend to provide a cause of action for the death of an unborn child.

5

Plaintiffs argue that because the Legislature included "unborn child" in the
criminal homicide statute, "it would logically and morally follow" that the
Legislature also intended to create civil liability for the death of an unborn child.
See Pis.' Op. Br. at 13-14. To the contrary, the Legislature's choice of language
leads to the opposite conclusion. The criminal homicide statute shows that the
Legislature uses the word "unborn" when it intends to include unborn children in a
statute's coverage. Since the Legislature has not done so in the wrongful death
statute, its intent could not be clearer.
And to the extent Plaintiffs argue that the inclusion of the unborn in the
wrongful death statute is "morally" required, that is an argument for a legislative
amendment, not judicial action. As this Court explained in Clyde. "While we
sympathize with the [plaintiffs] for their loss, we cannot ignore the plain language
of section 78-11-6. 'The fact that the result in some circumstances may be to
unreasonably restrict the class of persons who can bring a wrongful death action is
an argument for amendment of the statute, not for our ignoring its words.'" 920
P.2d at 1187 (citation omitted).
The Legislature's retention of the term "minor child" in the wrongful death
statute is particularly noteworthy in light of this Court's decisions rejecting claims
for the wrongful deaths of unborn children. See U.S. Op. Br. at 11-14 (discussing
6

Webb v. Snow. 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942) and Nelson v. Peterson. 542 P.2d 1075
(Utah 1975)). Plaintiffs devote a substantial part of their opening brief to a
discussion of whether Webb and Nelson represent binding precedent on this Court
under the principle of stare decisis. See Pis.' Op. Br. at 14-18. This misses the
point of the United States' citation of these cases. As discussed in the United
States' Opening Brief, the fact that this Court issued two decisions rejecting
claims for the wrongful deaths of unborn children provides additional evidence of
the Legislature's intent. See U.S. Op. Br. at 11-14. Since legislative bodies are
presumed to be aware of relevant judicial decisions, the Utah Legislature is
presumed to have been aware of the Webb and Nelson decisions when it amended
the wrongful death statute several times thereafter. If the Legislature had intended
that the statute cover claims based on the wrongful deaths of unborn children, it
had numerous opportunities to make its intent clear after this Court had rejected
such claims. The fact that the Legislature did not do so further demonstrates its
intent to limit claims to those arising from the deaths of children between birth and
18 years of age.

7

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the United States' Opening Brief, the
United States requests that this Court answer the issue certified by the United
States District Court as set forth in the United States' Opening Brief at 14.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2010.

CARLIE CHRISTENSEN
Acting United States Attorney
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AMY J. OLIVER
Assistant United States Attorneys
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